Maritime silk culture | New "maritime silk Road": China and Asean

The new "Maritime Silk Road" currently proposed by China lies in the following three points: First, ASEAN is new. Although Southeast Asia is a long-existing geographical region, it was identified as a unified region in international politics, just after World War II. Second, China is new. After about 200 years of extreme weakness and division, China is now once again a rising power. Third, the new "Maritime Silk Road" is new. The route, though ancient, was reopened by the current route.

1. Why did Southeast Asia become Southeast Asia

Southeast Asia has both continental and archipelago characteristics, because it is mainly composed of the Indochina Peninsula (or " Indochina, Indochina) and the Malay Archipelago (Malaisie). The divided geography has led to the formation of very diverse peoples in Southeast Asia. While land peoples have moved from the far north of central Central Asia, maritime peoples have historically migrated mainly from southern and southwest China to Taiwan Island, the Philippines, Vietnam, and to the Southeast Asian islands. The closure of the land and the openness of the sea contrast with the overall self-identity of Southeast Asia never happening. At that time, trade in Southeast Asia was dominated by Muslim businessmen from the Middle East, through South India, and businessmen from South China (mainly in Fujian and Guangdong provinces), bringing prosperity to the people living in the region. Westerners have only joined in as additional participants, expanding and strengthening the original trade model.

The powerful war ships owned by the Westerners became a new cause of change, gradually bringing to them a predominance position about 150 years later. It essentially means that whoever has the maritime power can dominate the trade. Later, the global oceans were first controlled by the British and then inherited by the Americans. During World War II, all of the 10 current ASEAN members today were directly or indirectly under Japanese civil or military administration for about three years. When the wave of post-war decolonization after World War II became inevitable, Britain and America realized that China and India would become forces not to be ignored for the region in the future. In order to maintain its influence and protect its interests after leaving, they used the World War II military term —— "Southeast Asia" to call the region, and fixed the name through numerous public opinion propaganda and academic research.

Three key events during the Cold War shaped ASEAN and Southeast Asia: Indonesia turned capitalism under Suharto's leadership, and four other countries (Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and the Philippines) were forced to take sides; the recognition in the 1970s allowed ASEAN to play an independent role, not just a pawn or puppet of the Cold War; the defeat and withdrawal of the United States in Vietnam. Due to the weakening of the United States, the rise of China and the change of its image, the 10-country ASEAN in the 1990s was completely restructured into an autonomous institution that could find its own place and determine its own destiny among any major powers. In addition to China's friendship and support, ASEAN has established regional dialogue mechanisms such as "10 + 1" and "10 + 3", which is a highlight moment when it plays a role in regional and world affairs.

Therefore, ASEAN cannot forget that it has always been created for a specific temporary purpose, and that it is relatively easy to divide in areas lacking deep natural roots, so it must be constantly vigilant and united.

2. China's understanding of the ancient and modern times of the ocean

Throughout Chinese history, all the problems, enemies and threats are in the north. Since there were no enemies in southern Xinjiang, ancient China always paid no attention to southern Xinjiang. It was not until the Song dynasty was driven to the south and the court had to rely on encouraging trade with Southeast Asia to maintain taxes and the economy that they began to notice southern Xinjiang. With the establishment of the Yuan Dynasty, the north was not a problem for China for the first time. When the Ming Dynasty took over, it inherited this world view and began Zheng He's voyages to the Western Seas, and then imposed the sea ban. Under the vacuum of the withdrawal of Chinese merchants, Europeans gradually became the dominant force in the Southeast Asian business system. The Opium War in the late Qing Dynasty was the first naval war in Chinese history, and the Chinese were greatly shocked that whether —— had a navy became an obvious question of survival. Since the reform and opening up, China's economy has relied on maritime trade to enter the market and obtain resources.So controlling your own waters and ensuring that maritime trade is protected is a matter of life and death. Since the 1990s, China was determined to build a navy.

For Southeast Asia, the elephant in the room was not China, but the Anglo-Saxon maritime hegemony that had existed for two hundred years. The same is true of China's goal of building a navy, which does not need to build islands in the South China Sea to tackle Vietnam, the Philippines or Malaysia, but it helps defend against the U. S. Navy threat. China will not directly confront and challenge the United States, because it still lacks enough capacity. There is no historical example of any Chinese people who want to dominate or manage the world, and they will not be stupid enough to think they can do it. China is focused on expanding the connectivity of trade ties and business routes to make its economic development sustainable.

3. China's dual identity as a sea and land power and the "Belt and Road"

China is not only a huge land power, maritime trade is also its economic lifeline. Therefore, China has no choice. It must be a land power with sufficient naval defence to take care of its survival interests in the future economic development. Finding the right balance is on their central agenda, and therefore they launched the "Belt and Road" initiative.

In the maritime direction, today's "Maritime Silk Road" is a viable path, but it depends on the power of the others who can actually control and play the role of police officers, that is, behind the modern maritime economy is the Anglo-American maritime hegemony. The wise people in the Chinese leadership do not want to challenge US military hegemony, but they want to ensure that they have enough naval power in their neighborhoods and backyards to be safe, as relations between their land neighbors remain complex and need to be handled with care.

Compared with the "Maritime Silk Road", which is mainly initiated by commercial interests, the "One Belt" connecting land trade has strong strategic and political implications from the very beginning. Now, realizing that all their eggs cannot be put in one basket by sea, the Chinese create other passages into the Indian Ocean through Rakhine State in Myanmar and Gwadar Port in Pakistan. In Southeast Asia, the "Belt and Road" also has a purely onshore route from Laos to Thailand, and then to Malaysia and Singapore, as well as other routes into Myanmar, Laos, and Cambodia, which are not dependent on the ocean. China may want to make money from new sea routes to pay for very expensive land routes that won't make them money. Land routes are expensive and dangerous, and it's not clear if they will eventually pay off, but this is China's strategic commitment to its own economic security.

4. International law complicates the issue of maritime delimitation

Another difficulty China faces in the ocean is how to apply and respond to the diplomatic issues of international law. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea has spent many years trying to resolve maritime delimitation issues, but in fact, international law itself is unclear to legislators and lawyers, and constitutes a controversial issue of itself, let alone helping to resolve maritime delimitation disputes. International law was first enacted by European countries to reduce conflict as they expand. Thus, it was only applicable to the European powers considered "civilized states," and not to any Eastern Empire. The Americans understand this better than the Chinese, so until today, the Americans have not ratified the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea because they know that some parts of it are not actually in their own interests. The new states formed after 1945 are mostly learning how to survive in this world of international law, but those that enacted it have learned how to use it, and certainly define laws in some way. We should therefore look at the function of international law in a very vague way.

(Excerpt from Nanyang Studies, No.2,2022)